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Abstract
Background: Though often used to control outbreaks, the efficacy of ward closure is unclear. This systematic
review sought to identify studies defining and describing ward closure in outbreak control and to determine
impact of ward closure as an intervention on outbreak containment.
Methods: We searched these databases with no language restrictions: MEDLINE, 1946 to 7 July 2014; EMBASE, 1974
to 7 July 2014; CINAHL, 1937 to 8 July 2014; and Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, 2005 to May 2014. We
also searched the following: IndMED; LILACS; reference lists from retrieved articles; conference proceedings; and
websites of the CDCP, the ICID, and the WHO. We included studies of patients hospitalized in acute care facilities;
used ward closure as a control measure; used other control measures; and discussed control of the outbreak(s)
under investigation. A component approach was used to assess study quality.
Results: We included 97 English and non-English observational studies. None included a controlled comparison
between ward closure and other interventions. We found that ward closure was often used as part of a bundle of
interventions but could not determine its direct impact separate from all the other interventions whether used in
parallel or in sequence with other interventions. We also found no universal definition of ward closure which was
widely accepted.
Conclusions: With no published controlled studies identified, ward closure for control of outbreaks remains an
intervention that is not evidence based and healthcare personnel will need to continue to balance the competing
risks associated with its use, taking into consideration the nature of the outbreak, the type of pathogen and its
virulence, mode of transmission, and the setting in which it occurs. Our review has identified a major research gap
in this area.
Background
While significant progress has been made in preventing
device and procedure-related healthcare-associated infec-
tions (HAI), the threat of antimicrobial resistant organ-
isms (ARO) and Clostridium difficile continues. In the
USA, the prevalence rate of HAI was 4 % in 2011 [1], and
it has been estimated that there are at least two million
ARO-related infections and 23,000 deaths each year [2],
resulting in $26–$33 billion additional medical costs [3].
An estimated 220,000 HAI and 8000 related deaths occur
in Canada per year [4]. Healthcare-associated C. difficile
and vancomycin-resistant Enterococci infections increased
from 2007 to 2012, and carbapenemase-producing organ-
isms appeared in 2010 [5]. The cost of readmissions alone
due to nosocomial C. difficile-associated diarrhea is esti-
mated to be at least $128,200 CDN per year per facility
[6]. These observations highlight the need for more effect-
ive prevention and control practices and better therapy.
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Outbreaks of HAI in healthcare facilities are not only
serious clinical events when affecting vulnerable patient
populations but are highly disruptive to care delivery.
Closure of affected clinical areas typically involves sus-
pending new patient admissions and has been used as a
means of controlling HAI outbreaks [7]. However, ward
closures restrict patient access to necessary care, may
lead to detrimental outcomes, and can be extremely
expensive to implement. Consequently, the role of ward
closure in outbreak control should be better understood.
Complete ward closures are typically exercised when
other outbreak measures have failed, or in the setting of
highly virulent organisms, or those known to spread rapidly
[8]. However, whether ward closure is a necessary control
intervention is not clearly established in the literature.
A number of studies have described the use of ward
closure for the purpose of outbreak control. One system-
atic review of worldwide HAI epidemics published in the
Worldwide Database of Nosocomial Outbreaks between
1965 and 2005 found that some level of ward closure was
used in 194 outbreaks, with a median closure time of
14 days and closure rate of 12.4 % [8]. Geriatric units were
significantly more likely to be closed due to outbreaks
compared to pediatric wards, and infectious pathogens
were significantly more likely to lead to ward closure com-
pared to contaminated medical equipment. Two specific
groups of pathogens were most often associated with ward
closure: norovirus (for 44.1 % of ward closures) and influ-
enza/parainfluenza virus (for 38.5 % of ward closures).
The literature generally suggests that ward closure is
a necessary control intervention as part of a bundle
[9–11] versus a bundle that does not include ward
closure [12, 13]. However, an analysis of a large stan-
dardized data set from 2009–2012 from the Hospital
Norovirus Outbreak Reporting Scheme in the UK found
that in instances where no ward closure was used, the
length of outbreaks was similar to those where wards were
closed but with fewer patients and healthcare workers
(HCW) affected (in total and per day of outbreak) [14].
To gain a better understanding of the role of ward clos-
ure in controlling outbreaks, we systematically reviewed
the published academic literature examining the use and
impact of ward closure for controlling outbreaks in the
acute care hospital setting. In addition to this review, we
developed a web-based environmental scan survey that
was distributed to IP&C practitioners and physicians at
acute care sites across Canada. The present systematic
review had two objectives: (1) to identify studies that de-
scribe ward closure as an outbreak control measure in
sufficient detail to determine how ward closure was de-
fined and what was done and (2) to determine the impact
of ward closure on outbreak control by answering the
following question: In hospitalized patients of all ages,
does the use of partial or complete hospital ward closure
have a significant impact on the control of an outbreak
due to invasive infection or colonization by pathogenic
microbes with the potential for spread, as compared to
not using hospital ward closure, with or without the use of
other infection control interventions and/or practices?
These two questions guided the protocol development,
which then informed the screening and selection process.
Methods
This review is not registered with PROSPERO.
Search strategy and selection criteria
To identify relevant references for this review, we
searched the following databases with no language re-
strictions or other limits: Ovid MEDLINE, including In-
Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations, 1946 to 7 July
2014; Ovid EMBASE, 1974 to 7 July 2014; CINAHL Plus
with Full Text, 1937 to 8 July 2014; and Cochrane Data-
base of Systematic Reviews, 2005 to May 2014. Our search
consisted of selected subject headings and keywords
related to the use of ward closure, combined with terms
for outbreaks of infectious diseases (see Additional file 1).
We also searched IndMED, using the same keywords, and
LILACS, using a combination of the keywords in English
and some of their Spanish and Portuguese equivalents. In
addition, we searched reference lists from retrieved arti-
cles and journals, conference proceedings, and the web-
sites of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
the International Centre for Infectious Diseases, and the
World Health Organization.
Two authors independently reviewed the title and
abstract of all articles resulting from the searches and
the retrieved full texts of the relevant articles. The re-
viewers appraised the published full-text articles for
inclusion according to the five criteria described below;
articles were rejected if they did not meet all of the
criteria. Disagreements during title and abstract screen-
ing and full-text review were resolved through third-
party adjudication.
Only those articles that were outbreak investigation
studies of hospitalized patients at acute care hospitals/fa-
cilities, including teaching and specialized institutions,
were included. Studies set in a long-term acute care
hospital were also included; however, studies set in a
long-term care facility, rehabilitative setting, or out-
patient clinic at a tertiary acute care hospital/facility
were excluded. To be included, studies needed to
identify ward closure (complete or partial) for at least
48 h (or length not specified) as an intervention to
help control outbreaks. We defined “complete ward
closure” as the application of ward closure across all
beds on a ward/unit and “partial ward closure” as the
application of ward closure to some, but not all, of the
beds on a ward/unit. “Ward closure” included any or
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all of the following: no new patients admitted to the area;
no transfers to other units within the healthcare facility
allowed unless required for ongoing care; and no transfers
to other healthcare facilities, including long-term care, with
no restrictions on discharge home [14]. “Ward closure” was
also assumed if the following synonyms and word variants
were used: “unit closure,” “wing closure,” “partial hospital
closure,” “halt new admissions,” “partial hospital closure,”
“no new admission,” “closure,” “limited admissions,” “de-
layed admissions,” and “department closure.” Studies were
also included only if a comparison intervention or another
infection control intervention other than ward closure was
applied and if they discussed control of the outbreak(s)
under investigation as an outcome. We adopted the Alberta
Health Services definition of outbreak: “the perceived, or
true occurrence of more cases of a communicable disease
than expected in a given area, or among a specific group of
people over a defined period of time” [15]. Measures of this
outcome included narrative accounts of outbreak control,
number of cases of illnesses, number of colonized or
infected inpatients, attack rates, relapse rates, and number
of deaths attributable to the causative pathogen. Only ori-
ginal research studies were included, but conference ab-
stracts were reviewed for relevance; if an abstract was
deemed relevant, the corresponding author was contacted
by one of the librarians for the published full text. We also
excluded studies that used surveys, secondary data analysis,
non-original reports, grey literature, editorials, letters, cost
analyses, and reviews.
Data extraction and analysis
The included studies were systematically reviewed and
relevant data was extracted from each article on the fol-
lowing parameters: study design, setting and population
characteristics, causative pathogen(s), details of ward
closure, details of other outbreak control interventions,
outcomes relevant to the review, including the number
of patients colonized and/or infected, and the role of
ward closure for controlling the outbreak were extracted
and recorded by one of the authors. Data from non-
English full-text articles were extracted by a researcher
who was a native or fluent speaker of the language and
had knowledge of data extraction for systematic reviews.
Relevant extracted data were collated in a descriptive
summary and tabular format based on the findings from
the parameters listed above.
We adopted Juni and colleagues’ [16] component ap-
proach to assess the quality of each study included in
this review. Six evaluative criteria were adapted from
components of the GRADE approach [17] and the
Downs and Black checklist [18] to develop an aggregate
measure for “confidence in the estimate of effect of the
body of evidence,” as done by Hsu and colleagues [19]
using GRADE. The first five criteria were taken from
the Downs and Black’s checklist for measuring study qual-
ity and the sixth criterion was developed by the authors to
assess the accuracy (reliability and validity) of the outcome
measures: (1) Are the characteristics of the patients in-
cluded in the study clearly described? (2) Is the interven-
tion of interest clearly described? (3) Are the main
findings of the study clearly described? (4) Were the main
outcome measures used accurate (valid and reliable)?
(5) Did the authors address the issue of confounding in
the analyses from which the main findings were drawn?
(6) Did the authors confirm cases using acceptable
diagnostic methods? For each criteria, a score of “0”
was assigned if the criteria was not met and “1” if the
criteria was met, providing a summated score between
0 and 6 for each article, where 0–1 indicates very low
quality; 2–3 indicates low quality; 4–5 moderate qual-
ity; and 6 indicates high quality.
Results
From the 2095 references gathered from all the sources
searched, a total of 97 English and non-English articles
in Dutch, French, German, Japanese, and Spanish were
accepted for inclusion (Fig. 1).
Of the 97 included studies, 67 were case series, 14
were case–control studies, 5 were cohort studies, 5 were
before-and-after studies, 5 were interrupted time series
studies, and 1 was a time series study. As there were no
studies that included a controlled comparison between
ward closure and other interventions, the studies included
in this review only allowed us to fulfill our first objective.
Thus, this review purely focused on studies that described
how ward closure was used as an outbreak control inter-
vention and its impact on the outbreak.
From the details provided within the context of the set-
ting and population, the studies were organized firstly by
the organ system(s) affected and secondly by the genus of
the causative pathogen within each of these organ system
categories. The organ system and genus categorization
lent itself very well to an additional categorization by the
mode of transmission, which is the basis for infection pre-
vention and control precautions. The organ system
categories included: “gastrointestinal,” consisting of 17
studies; “respiratory,” consisting of 11 studies; and
“multiple/mixed,” which includes the central nervous
system, skin/soft tissue, urinary tract, eye, abdominal,
and vascular or when more than one system is affected
simultaneously and consisting of 63 studies. Of the
studies in the third category, eight studies described
predominant colonization, 12 studies described pre-
dominant infection, and 43 studies described a com-
bination of colonization and infection. A sixth category
included six studies that described the impact of infection
control policies and of specific interventions on outbreak
control. The modes of transmission relevant to our study
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included contact (both direct person-to-person and indir-
ect via fomites and inanimate objects), droplet (via large
droplets within a 1–2 m radius of the individual), and
airborne (via small droplet nuclei capable of spreading
over distance of greater than 2 m through the air [20]).
Gastrointestinal system (Table 1)
We identified 17 studies [21–37] on outbreaks involv-
ing C. difficile, norovirus, rotavirus, Salmonella panama,
small round structured virus, or small round structured
virus and small round featureless virus. The primary
mode of transmission for all these pathogens is direct
person-to-person contact and indirect contact with con-
taminated surfaces [20]. The outbreaks occurred at sin-
gle facilities, of which four occurred at the facility-wide
level, and resulted in gastrointestinal system colonization
and/or infection among 3–116 inpatients. Between two
and ten intervention strategies were used in conjunction
with ward closure to control the outbreaks.
The definition of ward closure varied across the studies,
and ward closure lasted between 3 days and 1 month
among the studies that reported length of closure. Six stud-
ies defined ward closure as prohibiting new admissions to
the affected clinical area (i.e., unit/ward/bay) [21–26].
Widdowson and colleagues reported on a study that uti-
lized a phased approach, first halting new admissions and
discharging all cases, then halting all admissions and
discharging all patients from the area [27]. Three studies
described completely stopping both admissions and trans-
fers [28–30]. New admissions and transfers were stopped
and transfers were limited in the studies by McCall and
Smithson and by Stevenson and colleagues [31, 32]. In
addition to stopping new admissions, transfers were limited
in two studies [33, 34] and discharges were limited in one
study [35]. In Hoffman and colleagues’ study, only transfers
were limited [36]. One study did not specifically describe
their definition of closure [37].
Of nine studies that reported achieving outbreak
containment, six attributed it to all the measures used
[21, 25, 26, 28, 31, 33], two studies attributed it to
multiple, but not all the measures used [27, 37], and
one study did not specify which measures contributed
to the outcome [36]. In two studies, the reduced num-
ber of new cases of colonization and infection was
attributed to all the measures used [30, 32]. In two
other studies, the authors were uncertain which mea-
sures contributed to the reduced number of new cases
in one [35], while authors of the other did not report
which measures contributed to the reduced number of
new cases [29]. Kienitz and colleagues reported that new
cases continued to be identified until the pediatric ward
was closed; however, newly admitted patients became
infected until commercial milk was found to be the source
of the outbreak [24]. In three studies, the authors did not
report whether the outbreaks were controlled; however,
they reported that either all or a number of the measures
that were used could be effective at achieving outbreak
control [22, 23, 34].
Respiratory system (Table 2)
Eleven studies examined outbreaks of influenza A, para-
influenza, parainfluenza and respiratory syncytial virus,
severe acute respiratory syndrome, Streptococcus pneumo-
niae, or Streptococcus pneumoniae and Streptococcus spp.
[38–48] The primary mode of transmission for these patho-
gens is via the combination of both droplet through re-
spiratory secretions and direct and indirect contact [20].
The outbreaks occurred in one to multiple wards/units at
single facilities, of which two were at the facility-wide level,
and one was at multiple hospitals. The outbreaks resulted
in respiratory system infection and/or colonization among
7–30 inpatients; the number of affected patients was not re-
ported in one study [38]. In addition to ward closure, one
to nine other interventions were used to control the
outbreaks.
The affected clinical area was closed to new admis-
sions in six studies [39–44]. New admissions were
stopped in addition to discharges in two studies [45, 46]
and transfers in another [47]. Liu and colleagues reported
that construction work was undertaken during closure;
however, they did not specify the details and length of
Fig. 1 PRISMA flow diagram
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Table 1 Summary table for accepted studies—gastrointestinal system









4 geriatric wards (97 total)
at a teaching hospital (758);
Belgium
No new admissions; no
transfers (10d)
8 21/92 in total: 11





Urological ward; England No new admissions (1m) 5 17/42 in total: all





Vascular acute surgery ward
(24); Scotland








orthopedics departments at a
general hospital (176); Austria
No new admissions
(3 occasions: 11d, 9d, 9d)
3 56 in total NA All
Hoffmann
et al. [36]
34 wards at a teaching
hospital; Germany
Limited transfers (6d) 3 116 in total Y NA
Kanerva
et al. [34]
23 wards at a tertiary hospital
(504); Finland
No new admissions; limited transfers 5 240 in total: 181
(75 %) positive;





Acute elderly care ward;
Ireland
No new admissions; no transfers;
limited discharges (3d)
9 20 in total: 6 (30 %)





3 extended care (30 each),
acute care (37) wards at an
elderly extended care facility
(380); Australia
No new admissions; limited discharges;
(2 occasions: 22d, 13d)






11 wards at a geriatric
hospital (300); England
Stage 1: unspecified closure Stage 1: 4
Stage 2: 3
Stage 3: 1





Stage 2: no new admissions; no
transfers; limited discharges (12d)
Weber et al.
[26]
Pediatric psychiatric unit (10)
at a teaching hospital; USA
No new admissions (9d) 6 3/4 in total Y All
Zingg et al.
[30]
2 internal medicine wards at
a tertiary hospital (960);
Switzerland
No new admissions; no transfers 6 16/115 in total: 12
(75 %) positive, 3









Infectious disease (10) and
general infant (16) wards;
England
No new admissions (5d) 3 20 in total Y All
Srinivasan
et al. [37]
Neonatal unit; USA Unspecified closure of transitional
nursery
5 23/28 in total: 5





Neonatal medium care unit
(15), and pediatric and
maternity wards at a general
hospital; The Netherlands
Closure 1: no new admissions and





56/358 in total Y: relapse
after 2w
Multiple
Closure 2: no admissions and emptied




Pediatric ward in a specialty
hospital; Germany




Small round structured virus
Green et al.
[29]
Wards and a day hospital at
a mentally infirm hospital;
England
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closure [48]. In the study reported by Owolabi and
Kwolek, admissions were initially limited then com-
pletely stopped [38]. Ward closure lasted from 1 week
to 2 months in six studies; the length was not clear in
two studies.
In the studies that achieved outbreak containment,
this outcome was attributed to all the measures used in
four studies [40, 46–48], and multiple, but not all the
measures used in two others [41, 43]. Outbreak con-
tainment was attributed specifically to closure in one
Table 1 Summary table for accepted studies—gastrointestinal system (Continued)





No new admissions; limited transfers
(15d)
5 47 in total: 1 (2 %)
died
Y All
d days, w weeks, m months, y years
aIncludes deaths directly, indirectly, and attributable to infection
bMultiple includes ward closure
Table 2 Summary table for accepted studies—respiratory system












Infectious disease and AIDS wards (23)
at a tertiary care hospital (800); Spain
No new admissions
(2w)
7 8/23 in total Y All
Risa et al. [43] Adult behavioral health unit (26) at a
veterans hospital; USA
No new admissions 9 8/26 in total Y Multiple
Sartor et al.
[44]
Internal medicine unit (19) at a
medical school affiliate (700); France

















8 12/19 in total: Y Hand
hygiene
6 (50 %) positive
Parainfluenza and respiratory syncytial virus




5 30 in total (19 PIV-3, 7 RSV,
4 with both): 11 (37 %) died
Y Multiple
Severe acute respiratory syndrome
Gopalakrishna
et al. [46]














Hospital 2: 12 in total





Hospital 3: 6 in total
Liu et al. [48] Primary and tertiary care at a referral
medical center (2300); Taiwan, China
Undefined closure 12 16 in total: 4 (25 %) died Y All
Owolabi and
Kwolek [38]
Obstetrical unit at a general hospital;
Canada












ENT ward at a teaching hospital; UK No new admissions; no
discharges (1w)
4 7 in total Y NA
Streptococcus pneumoniae and Streptococcus
Denton et al.
[39]
Adult oncology unit (34); UK No new admissions
(11d)
5 8 in total Y Closure
d days, w weeks, m months, y years
aIncludes deaths directly, indirectly, and attributable to infection
bMultiple includes ward closure
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study [39] and hand hygiene in another [42]. In three
studies, the authors did not report which measures
contributed to outbreak control [38, 44, 45].
Other and multiple/mixed systems: predominant
colonization (Table 3)
The mode of transmission for the microbes de-
scribed within this category is via contact [20]. Eight
studies reported on outbreaks of Enterococcus, Escher-
ichia coli, Klebsiella pneumoniae, or Staphylococcus
aureus that resulted predominantly in colonization
and involved 3–59 patients at single facilities [49–56]. Be-
tween 4 and 11 other interventions were used in addition
to ward closure to control the outbreaks.
In six studies, no new admissions were permitted to
the affected clinical area. Ward closure entailed limiting
transfers and partial closure of four beds in the outbreak
described by Delmare and colleagues [49] and restricting
admissions and limiting transfers in the outbreak described
by Rettedal and colleagues [50]. The length of closure
ranged from approximately 3 days to 3 months. Barrett and
colleagues did not specify their use of closure [51].
The authors of four studies attributed outbreak con-
tainment to all the measures implemented [50, 52–54].
Delamare and colleagues attributed control to multiple
measures [49]. Barrett and colleagues attributed control to
treating nasal carriers with nasal mupirocin [51], and van
der Zwet and colleagues attributed control to cohorting of
colonized patients [55]. Additional patients became colo-
nized after control measures were implemented in one
study [55].
Other and multiple/mixed systems: predominant infection
(Table 4)
The major mode of transmission for the microbes
described within this category is via contact with the
exception of adenovirus and the echovirus where both
contact and droplet transmission occur [20]. We identi-
fied 12 studies that reported on outbreaks of Acinetobac-
ter baumannii, adenovirus, echo 19 virus, Enterobacter
cloacae, Escherichia coli, Klebsiella pneumoniae, Pseudo-
monas aeruginosa, or Staphylococcus aureus that resulted
predominantly in infection among 4–48 patients [7, 57–67].
The authors reported using 1–11 interventions in addition
to ward closure.
Ward closure involved closing the affected clinical area
to new admissions in eight studies [7, 57–63]. Admis-
sions to the affected clinical area were limited in two
studies [64]. In the study reported by Fujiwara and col-
leagues [65], admissions were first limited and then
completely stopped. Two studies did not define the clos-
ure used during the outbreak [66, 67]. Ward closure
Table 3 Summary table for accepted studies—other and multiple/mixed systems with predominant colonization













Adult ICU (16); France Limited transfer; 4 ICU
beds closed (8w)
4 15 in total Y Multiple
Iosifidis et al. [53] Pediatric oncology department
(16) at a teaching hospital; Greece
No new admissions
(3m)
9 21/32 in total:





dialysis ward; The Netherlands
No new admissions
(12d)








4 15/103 in total Y All
van der Zwet
et al. [55]














11 59 in total:
1 (2 %) infection
Y All
Staphylococcus aureus
Barrett [51] 2 adjacent orthopedic wards;
England
Unspecified closure 6 15 in total: all positive Y Antibiotic
treatment
Troelstra et al. A military hospital; The Netherlands No new admissions
(29d)
4 3 in total Y Environmental
disinfection
d days, w weeks, m months, y years
aIncludes deaths directly, indirectly, and attributable to infection
bMultiple includes ward closure
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lasted from 1 to 10 weeks in seven studies that reported
the length of closure.
Authors reported achieving outbreak control in 11 stud-
ies. This outcome was attributed to all the measures used
in three studies [57, 65, 67]. Successful containment was
attributed to multiple measures, excluding ward closure, in
two studies [57, 60] and the treatment of HCW carriers in
another [63]. How outbreak containment was achieved
was unknown in three studies [7, 61, 62]. Gupta and
colleagues attributed the reduction of new cases to all
measures instituted [59]. Kaneko and colleagues attrib-
uted control specifically to environmental disinfection
[64]. One study did not identify which measure(s) con-
tributed to control [66].
Other and multiple/mixed systems: combination of
colonization and infection (Table 5)
Of the remaining studies, 43 reported outbreaks that
affected other or multiple organ systems and resulted in
both of infection and colonization [68–110]. The major


















(Phase 2: 2.5 m)
Phase 1: 4 5 in total (Phase 1:




Finn et al. [58] Intensive (16) and intermediate





8 9/34 in total (2, 7):
3 (33 %) positive,
2 (22 %) died
Y All




5 17 in total Y All
Hamada et al. [67] Ophthalmology unit at a
teaching hospital; Japan
Closure undefined 5 18 in total Y All




8 47 in total Y Environmental
disinfection
Echo 19 virus
Purdham et al. [61] Neonatal unit; England No new admissions
(9d)




Dalben et al. [57] Neonatal unit (63) at a teaching
hospital (2200); Brazil






Lahoucine et al. [66] Adult, pediatric hematology,
oncology ward (36); Morocco
Closure undefined
(1w)




Moodley et al. [60] Intensive care/high care area
(34) at a regional hospital; USA









Gupta et al. [59] NICU; India No new admissions 5 48/2177 in total
over 6 outbreaks:




Zawacki et al. [63] NICU (18) at a pediatric
hospital; USA
No new admissions 11 4 in total: 2 (50 %) died Y Treating HCW
carriage
Staphylococcus aureus
Noone and Griffiths [7] Gynecological, neurosurgical,
gastroenterological, 2 acute
general surgical wards; England
No new admissions 4 28 in total (25 prior to
cleaning ward, 3 after
cleaning)
Y Do not know
d days, w weeks, m months, y years
aIncludes deaths directly, indirectly, and attributable to infection
bMultiple includes ward closure
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mode of transmission for the microbes described within
this category is via contact with the exception of
Coxsackie virus and parvovirus where both contact and
droplet transmission occur [20]. The studies reported on
outbreaks of the following: Acinetobacter baumannii,
Coxsackie virus, Enterobacter aerogenes, Enterobacter
cloacae, Enterococcus faecium, Escherichia coli, Klebsiella
pneumoniae, parvovirus, Salmonella, Serratia marcescens,
Staphylococcus aureus, or Streptococcus. For all but one
study that involved a total of seven hospitals, the
outbreaks occurred at one facility and affected a total of
3–245 patients.
Among these studies, the definition of ward closure
varied widely and lasted from 1 week to 2 months in
19 studies that reported the length of closure. Ward
closure was defined as limiting and then not accept-
ing new admissions to the affected clinical area in 30
studies [68–97], limiting admissions in three studies
[98–100] and limiting transfers in two studies [101,
102]. Ward closure entailed both stopping new admis-
sions to the affected clinical area(s) and limiting
transfers or discharges in four studies [103–106].
Boyce and colleagues reported that permanent closure of
a burn unit was necessary to control a MRSA (methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus) outbreak that could not
be controlled by the use of other measures, including
temporary closure on three occasions [107]. Three studies
did not provide specifics of their use of ward closure
[108–110].
Successful outbreak containment was reported in
the vast majority of the studies. This outcome was
attributed to multiple measures in five of the studies
[70, 73, 92, 103, 104], multiple measures, excluding
ward closure in one study [77], and to all the mea-
sures used in 13 of the studies [71, 75, 80, 81, 84, 88,
89, 95, 99–102, 105]. Other studies attributed out-
break control specifically to the closure of the af-
fected ward(s) [69, 78, 82, 85, 109, 110], provision of
dedicated and disposable equipment [72], disinfection
of equipment [94, 97], construction of a cohort isolation
ward outside of the affected hospital [108], disinfection of
the affected clinical area(s) during closure [76, 87, 90, 98,
106], cohorting enabled by ward closure [79], and treat-
ment of healthcare workers for carriage [93], as well as
death of the infected inpatients [86]. Seng and colleagues
reported not knowing which measure(s) contributed to
outbreak containment [91]. While the authors of three
studies reported unsuccessful containment [68, 74, 96].
Boyce and colleagues reported that permanent closure of
the burn unit, the source unit, was necessary to control a
MRSA outbreak on other units [107]. Moretti and
colleagues reported that a combination of measures con-
tributed to a statistically significant reduction (p < 0.001) in
the number of cases of colonization and infection [83].
Studies on infection prevention and control policies or
specific interventions (Table 6)
We identified six studies that focused on the impact of
specific infection prevention and control policies or a con-
trol intervention [12, 13, 111–114]. The mode of trans-
mission for the microbes described within this category is
via contact [20]. All the studies involved new policies and/
or interventions that influenced ward closure prerequi-
sites, ward re-opening criteria, and impact of alternate
measures to that of ward closure on outbreak control.
Recorded outcomes of the new policies and interventions
include duration of closure in two studies [12, 13], bed-
days lost in two studies [12, 13], and rate of new infection
cases in four studies [111–114].
In two studies reporting on norovirus outbreak(s), bay
closures supplemented with other measures were reported
to have a greater impact on the reduction of closure
length and bed-days lost than ward closure as a primary
intervention [12, 13]. Although a number of other inter-
ventions were used, Garcia and colleagues attributed a
reduction in the episodes and incidence density of infec-
tions to cleaning and disinfection during sequential clos-
ure of affected clinical areas [114]. In two other studies,
the authors indicated that successful containment could
not be achieved when ward closure was used as part of
the control strategy. In their 11-year study, Selkon and
colleagues found that a dedicated isolation unit with
controlled ventilation was crucial to reducing the inci-
dence rate of nosocomial MRSA infections [112]. Stone
and colleagues observed a significant decrease in the
incidence rates of C. difficile infection and MRSA when
a new policy entailing hand hygiene, education, and re-
striction on antimicrobial treatment was implemented
[113]. Lastly, Farrington and colleagues reported on the
incidence of MRSA during the application of a MRSA
control policy aimed at eradication over 10.5 years and
relaxation of the same policy for the next 1.5 years [111].
The authors reported a notable increase in MRSA inci-
dence following the relaxation period; however, the authors
noted that the increase could not be solely attributed to the
relaxation of the policy as there was also an increase in
admission of MRSA carriers.
Risk of bias
Owing to the nature of the studies included in this re-
view, a number of potential confounders and sources of
bias were identified. Firstly, none of the studies con-
trolled for confounding, and the majority of them did
not address the confounding factor bias when discussing
the impact of the interventions used. All of the studies
used ward closure in combination with other interven-
tions, and as such, the impact of each measure on out-
break containment could not be determined. Relatedly,
there may also have been a potential for a dose–response
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Table 5 Summary table for accepted studies—other and multiple/mixed systems with combination of colonization and infection








Alfandari et al. [97] ICU (16) and infectious
diseases unit at a general
hospital (400); France








Surgical (15), medical (12),
and intermediate care units
(6) at a teaching hospital
(1500); France
First outbreak: undefined
partial and complete closure





First outbreak: 20 in total: 16 (80 %) asymptomatic,
4 (20 %) infected, 1 (5 %) died Second outbreak: 7
in total: 3 (43 %) asymptomatic, 4 (57 %) infected
Y Closure
Enoch et al. [102] Neurosciences critical care
unit (21) and general ICU (14)
at a teaching hospital (1100);
UK
Phase 2: limited transfers (16d) Phase 1: 5 19 in total (16, 3): 8 (42 %) died; 9 (47 %) positive;




Koeleman et al. [76] Surgical ward at a teaching
hospital; The Netherlands
Stage 3: no new admissions
(12d)
Stage 1: 2 13 in total: 8 (62 %) infected,
5 (38 %) colonized
Y Closure for disinfection
Stage 2: 3
Stage 3: 2
Landelle et al. [77] 5 ICUs: 4 surgical and 1
medical (95 total) at a
teaching hospital (860);
France






Simor et al. [92] Burn unit (14) at a teaching
hospital; Canada
No new admissions (1w) 8 31/247 in total: 18 (58 %) infected;




ICU in a specialty hospital;
The Netherlands
Limited admissions 3 66 in total Y All
Coxsackie virus
Konjajev et al. [110] Neonatal unit, Yugoslavia Unspecified closure 2 6 in total Y Closure
Enterobacter aerogenes
Piagnerelli et al. [109] Geriatric acute unit (30);
Belgium
Unspecified (20d) 4 12 in total Y Closure
Enterococcus faecium
Bartley et al. [70] Renal unit (30), infectious
diseases unit at a teaching
hospital (800); Australia




47 in total Y Multiple
Outbreak: 11
Ergaz et al. [73] NICU (16); Israel No new admissions (1m) 6 11/18 in total: 3 (27 %) infections;















Table 5 Summary table for accepted studies—other and multiple/mixed systems with combination of colonization and infection (Continued)
Liu et al. [80] Surgical (15) and emergency
(10) ICUs at a teaching
hospital (1500); China
No new admission area (2w) 5 8 in total Y All
Moretti et al. [83] Gastroenterology clinic and
several units at a teaching
hospital; Brazil






Sample et al. [95] Hematology–oncology unit
(32) at a teaching hospital
(1100); Canada
Stage 1: limited admissions 5 16 in total: 3 (23 %) died Y All
Stage 2: no new admissions
Enterobacter cloacae
Donkers et al. [72] NICU at a teaching hospital;
Holland
No new admissions (<1m) 5 26 in total: 2 (8 %) died Y Dedicated and
disposable equipment
Modi et al. [81] NICU at a maternity hospital;
England
No new admissions 3 12 in total: 6 (50 %) positive;
6 (50 %); 2 (17 %) died
Y All
van den Berg et al.
[94]
NICU(15) at a tertiary hospital
(950); The Netherlands




Moissenet et al. [82] Neonatal ward (30) at a
children’s teaching hospital;
France
Phase 2: no new admissions
(1w≥ 2w)Phase 3: no new
admissions (1w≥ 2w)
Phase 1: 5 26/59 in total Y Ward closure
Phase 2: 3
Phase 4: 4
Quinet et al. [85] Neonatal unit (30); France Limiting admissions to infants
born at the hospital; no new
admissions (6w)




Carbonne et al. [101] Seven hospitals; France All 7 hospitals: limited transfers 7 13 in total: 4 (31 %) infected;
9 (69 %) positive
Y All
Grogan et al. [103] Pediatric intensive care;
Ireland
No new admissions; limited
discharges (1w)








First 7m: 5 8 in total (6, 2); 4 (50 %) died Y Multiple
Next 4.5m: 6
Laurent et al. [105] 4 ICUs (6, 6, 8, 1) at a
teaching hospital (858);
Belgium
Limited transfers, no new
admissions
11 30 in total: 9 (30 %) infected;
3 (10 %) died
Y All
Macrae et al. [106] Intensive care section (8) and
special care section (15) at a
neonatal unit; UK
Stage 1: limited transfers




22 in total: 15 (68 %) positive;
1 (14 %) died
Y Temporary ward
opened so infected














Table 5 Summary table for accepted studies—other and multiple/mixed systems with combination of colonization and infection (Continued)
McKee Jr. et al. [75] Intensive care nursery (30) at
a teaching children’s hospital;
USA
No new admissions (2w) 6 26/232 in total: 21 (81 %) positive; 5 (19 %) infected;
1 (4 %) died
Y All
Reish et al. [89] NICU at a tertiary care center;
Israel
No new admissions 3 8 in total: 5 (63 %) infected; 3 (37 %) positive; 3
(37 %) died
Y All
Ritter et al. [90] Surgical ward in a specialty
hospital; The Netherlands
No new admission 4 11 (10 %) infected; 4 (36 %) died Y Disinfection during
closure
Parvovirus
Pillay et al. [99] General pediatric ward;
England
Limited admissions 5 9 in total: 2 (22 %) patients infected Y All
Seng et al. [91] Adult surgical unit (28);
England
No new admissions 3 3/6 in total: 3 (50 %) positive;
3 (50 %) infected
Y Author does not know
Salmonella
Newman [98] NICU (18) at a teaching
hospital; Ghana
Limited admissions 3 21/72 in total Y Aseptic measures and
closure
Serratia marcescens
Assadian et al. [68] NICU (8) at a teaching
hospital (2168); Austria
No new admissions (10d) First outbreak:
4







Lewis et al. [78] Neonatal; England No new admissions (7w) 9 13/24 in total: 2 (15 %) died Y Closure
Maragakis et al. [79] NICU (36) at a tertiary care
hospital (926); USA
No new admissions 9 18 in total Y Closing beds to enable
cohorting
Staphylococcus aureus
Boyce et al. [107] Burn unit (4) at a teaching
hospital (580); USA
Stage 1: restricted admissions
(3 occasions)





Stage 2: permanently closed
Danchivijitr et al. [96] Burn unit; Thailand Phase 1: No new admission
(2m)
Phase 1: 3 19/29 in total: 14 (74 %) infected; 5 (26 %) positive;
5 (26 %) died
N NA
Phase 2: 2
Hill and Ferguson [74] Special baby care unit (24) at
a university hospital; UK
Stage 1: no new admissions (2
occasions: 10d, 2w)
9 35/315 in total: 2 (6 %) infected; 1 (3 %) died N NA
Kluytmans et al. [108] Hematology unit and surgical
unit at a teaching hospital;
The Netherlands
Undefined closure Outbreak 1: 5 27 in total: 24 (89 %) infected; 5 (19 %) died Y Mainly external cohort
isolation
Outbreak 2: 4
Price et al. [84] Neonatal medical and surgical
unit; England
No new admissions 13 11 in total: 2 (18 %) infected; 1 (9 %) died Y All
Rampling et al. [87] Male surgical (37) and female
surgical (32) wards; UK
Closure of one bay at a time;
no new admissions















Table 5 Summary table for accepted studies—other and multiple/mixed systems with combination of colonization and infection (Continued)
Rashid et al. [88] Burn unit (12) at a regional
hospital; Ireland
No new admissions (2w) 7 18/ 176 in total: 3 (17 %) infected Y All
Teare et al. [93] Burn unit (20) and plastics
unit (84); England





Deutscher et al. [71] Long-term acute care
hospital; USA
No new admissions (26d) 9 19 in total: 8 (42 %) positive; 3 (16 %) assumed; 8
(42 %) asymptomatic; 2 (15 %) died
Y All
Ramage et al. [86] Medical unit (24) at a
community hospital (235);
Canada
No new admissions 6 3/25 in total: 3 (100 %) died Y HCW treatment and
infected inpatient
deaths
d days, w weeks, m months, y years
aIncludes deaths directly, indirectly, and attributable to infection













elationship in studies that increased the extent of ward
closure, for example, from closing the unit to select
admissions to closing to all admissions. Secondly, there is
the potential for selection bias in studies that did not use
epidemiological typing and, subsequently, could not
confirm that all affected patients were colonized or in-
fected with the same strain of the causative pathogen. An-
other source of bias stems from the selection of specific
outcomes. Furthermore, some of the case definitions
relied on the presence of symptoms and did not confirm
cases with any diagnostic method or epidemiological typ-
ing, resulting in case finding bias. The studies could have
also been subject to recall bias as the vast majority of arti-
cles are retrospective. As all the articles included in this
study reported on successfully controlled outbreaks, it is
highly likely that the reviewed literature is vulnerable to
publication bias. Many of the articles failed to address
these potential sources of bias that may have contributed
to the main findings and, particularly, the impact of ward
closure on containing the outbreaks. This failure may be
attributed to the retrospective and observational nature of
outbreak investigation studies. Fourthly, definitions of
ward closure were varied between studies, potentially
creating bias in understanding the impact of ward
















2005–2007: ward closure; meet criteria
before reopening; terminal cleaning
Many norovirus outbreaks can be
controlled by bay closures when
combined with adequate infection
control support
2007–2011: isolation and cohorting in
bays to facilitate disinfection
New policy led to reduction in: duration
of closure from 6d to 5d and bed-days
lost from 180 to 96






2006–2008: Early ward closure New policy led to significant reduction
in: length of closure (p < 0 .041) and in
bed-days lost (p < 0.001)2008–2010: Closure of ward bays;
architectural installation; environmental
disinfections; enlarged infection control
team
Other and multiple/mixed systems with predominant infection Acinetobacter baumannii









clinical procedures limited; isolation;
dedicated HCW; contact precautions;
HCW and environmental screening;
education
Cleaning/disinfection led to a decrease
from 3.2 to 1.6 episodes per 100
patients, and incidence density of 9.2 to
5 infections per 1000d of stay
Other and multiple/mixed systems with combination of colonization and infection: Staphylococcus aureus








1985–1994: MRSA screening upon
admission to ICU; isolation; ward
closure; disinfection
Relaxation of policy and increase MRSA
upon admission led to an increased in
MRSA cases from 1 to 2 in 1994 to 74
cases in 1997
1994–1997: relaxed closure/reopen and
screening criteria







1967–1972: ward closure; standard
barrier nursing methods
Ward closure and barrier nursing did not
control the outbreaks
1972–1978: limited transfer;
construction of a isolation unit with
control ventilation
New policy led to reduction in
incidence rate of MRSA infection from
6.57 to 5.08 cases per 1000 admissions;
from 130 to 14 cases of infection
Combination of colonization and infection: Clostridium difficile and Staphylococcus aureus
Stone et al. [113] Acute medical







1994–1995: ward closure; national
guidelines
Ward closure and national guidelines
did not control the outbreaks
1995–1996: hand hygiene; education/
communication; antimicrobial
treatment restricted
New policy led to reduction in:
incidence rate of C. difficile infection
from 3.35 cases to 1.94 cases per 100
admissions (p < 0.05), and MRSA
incidence from 3.95 to 194 cases per
100 admissions (p < 0.01)
d days, w weeks, m months, y years
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closure and in determining whether the studies used
complete or partial closure.
Discussion
We sought to identify studies that describe the use of
ward closure as an intervention in outbreak control and
determine its importance. Our systematic review expands
on existing work by providing an extensive review of the
epidemiological literature on the use of ward closure as an
intervention to control outbreaks of pathogenic microbes
among inpatients hospitalized in acute care settings. We
identified 97 studies that described the use of ward closure
as part of a bundled approach to their strategy. None of
the studies used ward closure in a setting where it was
able to be isolated as a singular control measure, limit-
ing our assessment of the direct efficacy of ward clos-
ure on outbreak containment, which was one of our
primary objectives.
It was not possible to draw any firm conclusions about
the impact or effect of ward closure from the studies for
a number of reasons. Firstly, the use of “ward closure”
varied considerably within the papers included in the re-
view. Our review was unable to identify whether partial
or complete closure was instituted in the vast majority
of the studies, as precise definitions were not used to
describe the type or nature of ward closure. The results
suggest that there is not a universal definition of “ward
closure”; rather, ward closure refers to restrictions on pa-
tient movement into and out of a unit/ward or a facility
and could encompass a number of qualities and multiple
phases and/or degrees of application. Secondly, with the
exception of the prevention and control policy and inter-
vention studies, all of the studies of the included papers
were reports or descriptions of outbreak investigations. As
investigators could not manipulate exposures (i.e., the out-
break), all outbreak studies were observational in nature
and the results were thus susceptible to a number of
potential confounders. The vast majority of the included
articles did not record these potential confounders or
were not adjusted accordingly in any type of additional
analysis. The studies were vulnerable to multiple biases,
including confounding factor bias, publication bias, and
recall bias, and none of them reported taking measures to
prevent them or address their source. As Cooper and col-
leagues [115] noted, these studies generally did not meet
standards of planned research as most, if not all, outbreak
reports were written retrospectively. Thus, the majority of
the included studies were considered to be of poor quality
as the nature of outbreak investigation reports rendered
the use of high-quality study designs such as randomized
controlled trials unfeasible. Thirdly, all of the studies used
combinations of measures in an attempt to reduce or ter-
minate transmission. As a result, the relative contribution
of each measure, and especially ward closure, could not be
determined. The lack of attribution could be due to the
reporting style, as many authors listed all the measures
used without providing information on whether they were
instituted consecutively or concurrently. Overall, ward
closure was generally used at a late stage in conjunction
with other measures, primarily hygienic and disinfection
measures. Finally, considerable variability across the stud-
ies limits the generalizability and comparability of the out-
comes of the studies. Thus, we considered the conclusions
to be very weak when authors stated that the containment
of an outbreak could be attributed to any one of the mea-
sures used as potential alternative factors accounting for
the main findings could not be dismissed.
Our review highlights potential areas for further research
on the role of ward closure as an intervention measure for
managing and terminating outbreaks. Improving the quality
of reporting can be a first step to addressing the difficulties
in assessing the applicability and generalizability of these
studies [116]. Given the complexities of outbreak investiga-
tions and the nature of the studies, clear and detailed
reporting enables greater understanding of the context of
the outbreak, the outbreak itself, and the control measures
used, which may or may not include ward closure. Reports
of outbreaks that use ward closure should include a clear
definition or description of ward closure, timing of ward
closure, and at which point it was used in the investigation.
Given the nature of outbreak investigations, an experimen-
tal design would not be feasible. However, since the role if
any of ward closure in containing outbreaks is unknown,
quasi-experimental design is ethically unacceptable. Future
research can improve the rigor and internal validity by
using study designs of higher quality such as prospective
cohort studies and cluster randomized trials. For example,
a cluster randomized design study of ward closure, or no
ward closure plus a defined bundle of other interventions
for specified outbreak organisms, could be conducted.
Further, formal assessment of the frequency and out-
comes of unit closure versus no unit closure during an
outbreak could be undertaken. This should include gath-
ering information on the type of outbreak where a unit
is closed, duration of the outbreak, whether or not the
unit is closed, and the impact on patient flow, examining
both admission and discharge. While there are some
inconsistencies in the quality and format of reporting,
there are some metrics that are consistently reported, in-
cluding number of beds, length of closure, and bed-days
lost. This information could inform an economic study
using modeling to predict the cost of implementing
ward closure. Finally, there are potential ethical and legal
considerations in deciding whether to implement closure
of care settings during outbreaks that are not addressed
in the literature reviewed nor within this review. On the
one hand, failure to restrict admissions implies that new
and unaffected patients are knowingly admitted to an area
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known to have ongoing transmission of a potential patho-
gen; on the other hand, closure of a clinical area may re-
duce access to care.
While this review was undertaken with rigor and in
accordance with the requirements of systematic review
methodology, it is important to note its limitations. Firstly,
for the majority of articles, data were extracted by a single
reviewer; however, initial screening was undertaken rigor-
ously by two reviewers, and disagreements were resolved
with a third-party adjudicator. Secondly, the literature avail-
able for this review could report a positive effect of ward
closure, as it is possible that there are many outbreaks that
were controlled without using ward closure and were never
published. Similarly, outbreaks where interventions failed
to control transmission leading to endemic transmission
are less likely to be published. For example, it is common
for long-term care facilities to use ward (or facility) closure
(along with other interventions) to control gastrointestinal
and respiratory outbreaks, and these are seldom published.
While the outbreaks are generally controlled and the ward
(or facility) is re-opened, the key question is whether ward
closure is necessary and effective. Lastly, the review is
based on the last electronic search which was com-
pleted in July 2014, and as such the review may not be
entirely up to date.
It can be concluded that ward closure for containment of
outbreaks remains an intervention that is not evidence
based in the traditional sense; however, this review demon-
strates that ward closure is frequently used and was always
used as part of a bundled approach, whether as part of a se-
quence of, or in parallel with, other interventions, and in this
sense, is similar to other public health responses. However,
it was interesting to observe that in the majority of the stud-
ies in this review, ward closure was applied in the late stages
of the overall outbreak response rather than as a first meas-
ure. In addition, in 16 studies, despite the use of ward
closure, additional cases continued to be reported, sug-
gesting that ward closure was not an effective interven-
tion in these settings. Other than general wards, which
were not described well, burn units (n = 3), geriatric
wards (n = 3), and neonatal intensive care units (n = 2)
were reported more than once (Tables 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6).
The most frequently recorded mode of transmission
was contact with viral gastrointestinal-associated vi-
ruses (four norovirus and one small round structured
virus) and bacterial (S. panama, C. difficile, E. faecium,
and E. coli), making up 56 % of the pathogenic species.
These pathogens are known for their persistence within
environmental niches and relative resistance to com-
monly used disinfectants.
There are also potential ethical considerations in the
closure of wards during outbreaks that are not ad-
dressed within the context of the reviewed studies and
would need to be taken into consideration by infection
control personnel and hospital administrators. Admit-
ting new and unaffected individuals to a hospital ward
that is known to have ongoing transmission of a
potential pathogen, particularly if associated with a
high case fatality rate, warrants careful deliberation.
The risk of new transmissions needs to be juxtaposed
against the failure to contain the outbreak despite
closure, the disruption of care delivery, and lack of
access to care for other patients and overloading other
care units, particularly emergency departments, where
the risks of overcrowding and delayed care present
other challenges.
With no published controlled studies associated with a
benefit from ward closure, infection control practitioners
and hospital administrators will need to continue to
balance the competing risks, taking into consideration the
nature of the outbreak, the type of pathogen and its viru-
lence, mode of transmission, and the setting in which it
occurs and take reasonable steps to protect patients, and
since ward closure has been used in the past, it will likely
continue to be used as an intervention strategy until better
quality evidence is available.
Conclusions
The present systematic review could not ascertain the
impact of ward closure on outbreak containment for any
of the included studies based on our primary objective.
Ward closure was commonly reported as an interven-
tion during the course of a wide range of outbreaks, and
outbreak control was described in most settings with the
use of ward closure, usually in the late stages of the out-
break and was always used in parallel or in sequence
with other interventions. Our results highlight that there
is no universal definition of ward closure, as it has been
defined in various and imprecise ways in the included
studies. Since the published literature to date consists of
uncontrolled observational study designs that were vul-
nerable to a number of potential confounders and biases,
the actual impact of ward closure could not be deter-
mined. Our review has identified a number of research
gaps and new opportunities for future investigations. In
particular, the ability to determine the generalizability and
applicability of ward closure as a control intervention
could be improved by standardizing outbreak investigation
reporting to include information on the use, role, preci-
sion of definition, and timing of ward closure.
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